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RACE AND NEGOTIATION PERFORMANCE*By Charles B. Craver**
In major league baseball, nineteen percent of the players are black.As of 1992, 150 of the 200 agents registered with Major LeagueBaseball Players Association had active clientele; black agentsaccounted for a mere three percent of this 150. In professionalfootball, sixty-nine percent of the players are black, but blackagents comprise only fourteen percent of the registered agents withactive files. Worse yet, more than eighty percent of the NBA’splayers are black, but less than ten percent of them have blackagents.1
I.  INTRODUCTIONWhy are many prominent black athletes reluctant to retain black agents to represent them?One factor undoubtedly concerns the high profile success of white agents such as David Falk inbasketball and Leigh Steinberg in football, and the ability of these super-agents to attract drafteligible black athletes.2 Another may involve the fact that “many black players have internalizedracial stereotypes about blacks and thus, discriminate against their own people.”3 The athletes mayprivately believe that white agents can negotiate better contracts than black agents.Mr. Sammataro reasonably asks “whether there are in fact any meaningful differences in themanner in which white and black agents negotiate and, more importantly, whether these differencessignificantly affect the resulting contracts.”4 One wonders what other groups ask similar questionsregarding the negotiating capabilities of white and black professionals. Do hiring partners at lawfirms and business entities consciously or subconsciously question the negotiating ability of blacklaw or business school graduates who are seeking new employment? Do law firm partners orcorporate managers raise similar concerns when they decide which individuals to make partners orupper level managers? Are the unvoiced suspicions of such crucial decision-makers supported by
2empirical findings?5This article will empirically compare the results achieved by black and white students on theexercises conducted in my Legal Negotiating course. It will initially explore the perceiveddifferences between African-American and Caucasian behavior. Statistically established distinctionsrelevant to negotiation interactions will be examined, and unsupportable stereotypes will bediscussed. Comparisons will be made concerning the manner in which African-Americans andCaucasians deal with the stress of highly competitive situations.A statistical comparison will then be made between the results achieved by African-Americanand Caucasian students over the past 9 years on the negotiation exercises employed in my LegalNegotiating course. Despite the fact that some stereotypical beliefs might suggest that African-Americans would not be as effective as their Caucasian cohorts in such competitive encounters, myanecdotal experiences have not discerned any apparent differences regarding the results attained byAfrican-American and Caucasian students. I have thus hypothesized that I would find no statisticallysignificant differences between the settlements achieved by the African-American and Caucasianstudents in my Legal Negotiating course. This Null Hypothesis includes two basic components. First,that the average results obtained by African-American and Caucasian students would beapproximately equal. Second, that there would be no evidence to suggest that Caucasian negotiatorshave employed a more competitive approach that might generate similar means, but more skewedresults evidenced by higher standard deviations.
II.  REAL AND PERCEIVED RACIAL DIFFERENCESNegotiations involving participants from diverse ethnic backgrounds frequently develop
3differently than bargaining interactions involving persons from similar backgrounds. People tend tonegotiate more cooperatively with opponents of the same race and culture than with adversaries ofdifferent races and cultures.6 This is due to the fact that similarity induces trust and reduces the needfor the interactors to maintain a particular “face” in each other’s eyes.Different meanings may be ascribed to identical speech and behavior by members of differentraces because of their different acculturation experiences.7 For example, if an African-American anda Caucasian were to encounter a rude server at a restaurant, they would be likely to view the situationdifferently depending upon the race of the server. If the server were Caucasian, the African-Americancustomer might attribute the poor treatment to the server’s dislike of black patrons, while theCaucasian customer might simply consider that particular server rude. On the other hand, if theserver were black, the white patron might decide that the server is hostile toward white customers,while the black customer might perceive no racial element. If a Caucasian hiring partner of aprestigious law firm were to ask white and black law student applicants about their LSAT scores andlaw school GPAs, the Caucasian students would probably provide the requested information withouthesitancy, while the African-American students might wonder if the partner were only asking blackstudents about such factors based upon that person’s biased belief that minority law students are lessqualified than their non-minority cohorts.Individuals from different ethnic backgrounds bring certain stereotypical baggage into theirnew interactions.8 It is amazing how many common characteristics – positive, negative, and neutral-- are attributed by many persons to all individuals of a particular race. Professor Andrea Rich’sstudy of the perceptions of UCLA undergraduate students in the early 1970s graphicallydemonstrated how closely Caucasians and Chicanos stereotyped African-Americans, Caucasians and
4African-Americans stereotyped Chicanos, and African-Americans and Chicanos stereotypedCaucasians.9 When people who harbor such stereotypical beliefs initially encounter individuals fromother races, they tend to attribute their stereotypical preconceptions to those persons, and thisphenomenon may influence the preliminary portion of their interaction.Students I have taught at various law schools over the past twenty-five years have oftenallowed their stereotypical beliefs to influence their bargaining encounters. Many of my students –regardless of their ethnicity – think that Caucasian males are the most Machiavellian and competitivenegotiators. They expect them to employ adversarial and manipulative tactics to obtain optimalresults for themselves. On the other hand, numerous students expect African-American, Asian-American, and Latino-American negotiators to be more accommodating and less competitive. Whenopponents fail to behave in the anticipated manner, the bargaining process may be adversely affected.Even members of one race may stereotype other members of the same race. Several yearsago, four African-American students in my class were randomly selected to work together on anegotiation exercise. They seemed so pleased to have the opportunity to conduct an exercise entirelywith other African-American colleagues. When they had their initial meeting, both sides announcedtheir opening offers. They discussed their respective positions for a while, but neither side changedits stated position. Even though the two teams met for several hours over two more days, neither sidemodified its first offer. When we discussed their resulting nonsettlement in class, I asked each pairwhy they had been unwilling to move toward the opposing side. It turned out that neither side hadbeen willing to move, because each team has expected their “less competitive” African-Americanadversaries to make the first concession!Despite the unreliability of many stereotypical beliefs and the absence of more recent surveys,
5several empirical studies have found a few relevant differences between African-American andCaucasian interactants. African-Americans tend to be high in terms of Interpersonal Orientation(IO).10 High IO individuals are more sensitive and responsive to the interpersonal aspects of theirrelationships with others.11 This tendency should make African-American more effective negotiators.Since bargaining outcomes are directly affected by the interpersonal skills of the participants, highIO individuals should be able to achieve better results than their low IO cohorts.During verbal encounters, African-Americans tend to speak more forcefully and with greaterverbal aggressiveness than Caucasians.12 In competitive settings, this trait might enhance thebargaining effectiveness of individuals with these traits, while in cooperative situations it mightundermine their ability to achieve mutual accords. When they interact with others, African-Americans tend to make less eye contact while listening to others than do Caucasians, which maybe perceived by speakers as an indication of indifference to what is being said or disrespect towardthe speaker.13 Such behavior might undermine the ability of the persons with minimal eye contactto establish the kind of rapport that can advance bargaining discussions.Most negotiators tend to employ a cooperative/problem-solving or a competitive/adversarialstyle when they bargain with others.14 Cooperative/problem-solvers tend to be open with theirinformation, prefer to use objective criteria to guide their discussions, and endeavor to maximize thejoint return achieved by interactants, while competitive/adversarials tend to be less open withinformation, focus more on stated positions than objective factors, are manipulative, and attempt tomaximize their own side’s return. Caucasian negotiators usually employ relatively consistentbargaining styles, while African-Americans tend to adopt styles that are reflective of the race of theiropponents. They tend to perform more effectively when they compete with Caucasians and when
6they cooperate with other African-Americans.15African-Americans who have experienced discriminatory treatment by Caucasian teachersand classmates may be initially distrustful of White negotiating opponents. They may fear thatCaucasian students think they have the right to get more advantageous bargaining terms than theirblack cohorts. Such beliefs may cause black negotiators to behave more cautiously and lesstrustingly, making it more difficult for the bargainers to achieve mutually efficient agreements. Thiswould undermine the ability of both sides to obtain optimal results.
III. LEGAL NEGOTIATING COURSE METHODOLOGYThe initial Legal Negotiating class is devoted to an explanation of the course format and theevaluation process. I tell the students that they will explore the negotiation process and the factorsthat influence bargaining encounters. They will engage in a series of negotiation exercises. Althoughthe first two or three simulations will be for practice purposes and will not affect course grades, thenext five exercises will be used to determine two-thirds of class grades.16 Each negotiation exerciseis structured in a “duplicate bridge” format. Every participant receives identical General Informationdescribing the relevant factual circumstances and the specific issues that must be resolved throughthe negotiation process. All of the individuals on the same side of an exercise receive the sameConfidential Information apprising them of special information possessed by their client, explainingtheir client’s bargaining objectives, and the manner in which they will be evaluated if they achieveagreements or fail to generate accords. They are usually assigned one or two zero-sum problems thatonly concern the amount of money one side will pay to the other, because many litigation and non-litigation interactions are limited to these types of “distributive” situations that involve head-to-head
7competition.17 They are also assigned several non-zero-sum exercises that permit cooperativenegotiating parties to simultaneously increase their respective satisfaction levels through efficient“integrative” bargaining that is designed to maximize the joint return achieved by the participants.Class members negotiate on a one-against-one or a two-against-two basis. On someoccasions, students are assigned partners to assist them with complex issues and to demonstrate thedifficulties negotiators may encounter with respect to individuals on their own side. The studentslearn that in practice opposing counsel often achieve tentative accords with minimal difficulty, andthereafter encounter problems when they try to convince their respective clients to accept thereasonable terms negotiated. For each exercise, participants are randomly assigned differentopponents and, when relevant, different partners. This is done to maximize the number of individualswith whom they will interact throughout the term18 and to prevent one student from having anexcessive impact on the course grade of another student.I evaluate the performances of class members on a curve, based on each side’s resultsmeasured against the scoring information contained in that side’s Confidential Information. Thestudents are then ranked from high to low and are assigned  “placement” points for grading purposes.For example, if  ten groups of students negotiate on a two-against-two basis, the most successfulteam on Side A receives ten placement points, the second highest receives nine placement points,and so forth. A similar ranking process is carried out with respect to the individuals on Side B. Iftwenty pairs of students interact on a one-against-one basis, the highest student on Side still receivesten placement points, but the second highest student receives 9.5 placement points, the third highestparticipant receives 9.0 placement points, and so forth. This half-step scale is used to provide thetwo-against-two and the one-against-one exercises with equal weight.
8Each class member is also required to prepare a ten- to fifteen-page paper exploring thenegotiation process. The writers are instructed to analyze their bargaining interactions based on theconcepts covered throughout the term. Some papers focus on the different negotiation stages, theefficacy of diverse bargaining techniques, the impact of race, gender,19 or similar factors onbargaining encounters, the use of deceptive tactics,20 the importance of verbal and nonverbalcommunication, and other similar topics.  Students may elect to take the class on a credit/no-creditbasis, and they are informed that they will automatically receive a “credit” if they participate in theassigned exercises and submit acceptable papers.During the first half of the semester, we explore theoretical and practical concepts pertainingto the negotiation process. Students are assigned chapters from Effective Legal Negotiation andSettlement21 and are encouraged to read Getting to Yes.22 The class considers the psychologicalfactors that influence negotiation interactions, along with the impact of verbal and nonverbalcommunication. Students evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative/problem-solving andcompetitive/adversarial bargaining styles, and I encourage them to contemplate the use of a hybridcompetitive/problem-solving approach that is designed to generate beneficial client results whilesimultaneously maximizing the joint returns obtained by both sides. The manner in which thepersonal needs of clients and attorneys and the different types of legal problems and relationshipsmay affect bargaining encounters is discussed. The class then examines the various stages of thenegotiation process (Preparation Stage, Preliminary Stage, Information Stage, Distributive Stage,Closing Stage, and Cooperative Stage23), to apprise students of the primary objectives associatedwith each. The strengths and weaknesses of the various techniques negotiators are likely to encounterare assessed. Specific negotiating issues pertaining to such topics as the commencement of litigation
9settlement talks, dealing with government agencies, telephone negotiations, and the use of neutralintervenors to facilitate inter-party discussions are next examined. The class explores the impact ofcultural and ethnic differences and gender role expectations on bargaining interactions. The class considers the use of “attitudinal bargaining” to modify the unacceptable behaviorof some opponents. Students are reminded how much excessively competitive classmates want toachieve extraordinary results and of the fact that if the less competitive participants are willing toaccept the possible consequences of nonsettlements, those students can usually alter the offensiveconduct of their competitive adversaries. Once overtly competitive individuals realize they may beforced to forego agreements if they continue to behave inappropriately, they generally conform toexpected class norms.
IV. STATISTICAL FINDINGSWhen an observer attempts to determine whether there may be a relationship betweendifferent factors, it is appropriate to establish Null and Alternative Hypotheses. The Null Hypothesisassumes the absence of any correlation, while the Alternative Hypothesis assumes that somerelationship in fact exists. The relevant data are then analyzed to determine whether there appearsto be a correlation between the factors being compared.Statistical tests calculate the probability that any observed differences between comparedfactors are due to random considerations rather than some alternative explanation. The probabilitythat any observed difference is due to chance is referred to as the “p-value.”24 Social scientiststraditionally reject the Null Hypothesis when the p-value pertaining to a discerned difference is lessthan 0.05, which indicates a probability of less than one in twenty that the observed difference is due
10to chance rather than the assumed alternative explanation.25 When, on the other hand, the probabilityis high that the observed difference is due to chance – a p-value above 0.05 – social scientiststraditionally do not reject the Null Hypothesis.26The logical implications of rejecting or failing to reject a Null Hypothesis are different.Refusing to reject the Null Hypothesis here means that the data provide no substantial evidence thatthere is any relationship between student race and their performance on Legal Negotiating courseexercises.27 When the p-value is greater than 0.05, social scientists conclude that there is nostatistically significant difference between the factors being compared.28In this study, rejecting the Null Hypothesis means that the data provide sufficient evidencethat an alternative explanation accounts for any observed relationship between student race and theirnegotiation exercise performance. In this case, social scientists would conclude that there is astatistically significant correlation between the measured factors.29 Although it is not certain that theAlternative Hypothesis actually accounts for the measured relationship, it is reasonable to assumethe presence of the observed correlation in the absence of any other possible explanation.This study evaluates the possible relationship between student race and negotiation exerciseperformance. The Null Hypothesis is that there is no correlation between student race and the resultsthey achieve on Legal Negotiating course exercises. The Alternative Hypothesis is that there is arelationship between student race and the results they achieve on Legal Negotiating course exercises.Although I have sixteen years of Legal Negotiation course data at George WashingtonUniversity, I decided to focus on the data covering the past nine years. This decision is based uponthe fact that the classes I taught from 1986 through the Spring of 1992 contained insufficientnumbers of African-American students to permit meaningful statistical comparisons. For two years
11(1988 & 1991), I had no African-American students in my class; for three years (1989,  1990 &Spring 1992), I had only one African-American student; and in 1986, I had two black students.Beginning with the Fall of 1992, I began to have greater numbers of African-Americanstudents in my Legal Negotiation classes. Each class from the Spring of 1992 through the Fall of2000 included at least three African-American students, with some classes containing five, six, andeven seven black students. I thus decided to concentrate on these more recent years, to providesufficient data samples to permit meaningful statistical comparisons.Even if racial differences had no statistically significant impact on the results achieved byblack and white students on my Legal Negotiation course exercises, a separate factor might inducesome observers to anticipate lower average scores by African-American students. As a result ofaffirmative action admissions policies designed to enhance law student diversity, some African-American students are admitted to law schools with lower undergraduate GPAs and lower LSATscores than their Caucasian cohorts. To the extent these factors are predictive of success in lawschool – measured by law school GPAs – one might expect African-American students to haveslightly lower law school GPAs than Caucasian students. If this assumption were correct, it mightsuggest that lower GPA African-American students would perform less well on negotiation exercisesthan higher GPA Caucasian students.A comparison of the mean GPAs achieved by African-American and Caucasian  students inmy Legal Negotiation course from the Fall of 1992 through the Fall of 2000 does indicate slightlylower GPA averages for African-American students than for Caucasian students. A PearsonCorrelation Coefficient30 was computed which resulted in a coefficient of -0.275 comparing the meanGPAs of black students with the mean GPAs of white students. The corresponding p-value of 0.0000
12indicates that there is a statistically significant correlation between race and GPAs, with the averageGPAs of African-American students being slightly lower than the average GPAs of Caucasianstudents.Despite the slight differences in GPA means between black and white Legal Negotiationcourse students, I did not expect this factor to influence negotiation exercise score results. I hadpreviously evaluated the correlation between student GPAs and negotiation exercise scores forGeorge Washington University students and found no statistically significant correlation.31 I alsocalculated a Pearson Correlation Coefficient comparing student GPAs with their respectivenegotiation exercise scores for the years 1992 through 2000. The coefficient of 0.007 is minuscule,and the corresponding p-value of 0.880 would strongly suggest the absence of any statisticallysignificant relationship between student GPAs and their respective negotiation exercise scores. Asa result, I would not expect the slightly lower GPA means for African-American students comparedto their Caucasian cohorts to have any meaningful impact on the negotiation scores achieved byblack and white Legal Negotiation class students over the past nine years. If any negotiation scoredifferences were found, I would suspect that they would be attributable to the race of the participantsrather than to mean GPA differences between black and white students.To determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the negotiationexercise scores achieved by African-American and Caucasian students, I employed two separateprocedures. I first computed the mean scores for black and white students for each of the past nineyears, and compared the mean differences using a t-test.32 The results are set forth in the followingTable.
13TABLEt-Test Comparison of Student Race and Negotiation Score Means______________________________________________________________________________ Year N Wht.    N Blk.   Mean Wht.    Mean Blk.     Mean Neg.   Wht. Std.  Blk. Std.  P-Value33__________________      Neg. Score    Neg. Score    Score Diff.       Dev.          Dev.                      1992      51           3           41.033            38.333          2.700             9.521         7.422     0.6325  1993     53           4           40.630            34.825          5.805            10.845       13.564    0.3137  1994      52           5           39.665            40.240         -0.575            11.833       11.358    0.9175  1995      44           4           28.941            36.200         -7.259              9.528        7.767     0.1470  1996      44           3           35.016            37.800         -2.784            10.137        9.987     0.6473  1997      34           5           26.797            28.160         -1.363             6.453         7.548     0.6679  1998      31           6           33.855            33.883         -0.028             7.987         8.452     0.9937  1999      41           6           31.661            32.200         -0.539             9.995         6.007     0.8987  2000      32           7           27.572            23.714          3.858             7.722         8.169      0.2432                                                                                                                                                            The statistical data set forth in the Table provide strong support for the Null Hypothesis.There is not a single year for which the t-Test resulted in a mean difference based upon race at the0.05 – or even the 0.10 – level of statistical significance. For three of the nine years34 the meannegotiation scores for white students were slightly above the mean scores for black students, whilefor the other six years,35 the mean negotiation scores for African-American students were slightlyabove the mean scores for Caucasian students.In recognition of the fact that the total number of African-American students in some of theclasses was relatively low, I also calculated a Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the aggregate datapertaining to all nine years. The correlation coefficient comparing race with mean negotiationexercise scores was a mere -0.0527, with a p-value of 0.2594. This p-value provides furtherstatistical support for the Null Hypothesis.The last factor to be evaluated concerns a comparison of the African-American and
14Caucasian student standard deviations. For five years,36 the standard deviations for white studentswere slightly above those for black students, while the reverse was true with respect to the other fouryears.37 These data provide support for the second part of the Null Hypothesis – i.e., no statisticallysignificant difference between white and black student standard deviations.
V. IMPLICATIONSIndividuals who commence negotiations with people of different races should appreciate theneed to establish trusting and cooperative relationships before the serious substantive discussionsbegin. This approach should significantly enhance the likelihood of mutually beneficial transactions.The preliminary stage of their interaction may be used to generate a modicum of rapport.38Negotiators should try to minimize the counterproductive stereotypes they may consciously orsubconsciously harbor toward persons of their opponent’s ethnicity. If they anticipate difficultinteractions as a result of such usually irrational preconceptions, they are likely to generate self-fulfilling prophecies. If they conversely expect their opponents to behave more cooperatively andless manipulatively because of the ethnicity of their adversaries, they may carelessly lower theirguard of give those persons an inherent bargaining advantage. They must also try to understand anyseemingly illogical reactions their opponents may initially exhibit toward them as a result of thoseindividuals’ stereotyping of them.If the first contact negotiators have with opponents indicates that those persons are expectinghighly competitive transactions, they should not hesitate to employ “attitudinal bargaining” todisabuse their opponents of this preconception.39 They should create cooperative physical andpsychological environments. Warm handshakes and open postures can initially diminish combative
15atmospheres. Cooperative negotiators can sit adjacent to, instead of directly across from, opponents.In a few instances, it may be necessary to directly broach the subject of negative stereotyping, sincethis may be the most efficacious way to negate the influence of these feelings.40People who participate in bargaining transactions should recognize that the specificcircumstances and unique personal traits of the individual negotiators – rather than generalizedbeliefs regarding ethnic characteristics – determine the way in which each interaction evolves. Eachopponent has to be evaluated and dealt with differently. Is that individual a cooperative or acompetitive bargainer? Does the other side possess greater, equal, or less bargaining powerconcerning the issues to be addressed? What bargaining techniques are likely to influence thatperson? What negotiating techniques has that individual decided to employ, and what are the mosteffective ways to counter those tactics? As the instant transaction unfolds, strategic changes willhave to be made to respond to unanticipated disclosures or to changed circumstances.When negotiators find themselves attributing certain characteristics to opponents, they mustcarefully determine whether those attributes are based on specific information pertaining to thoseparticular opponents or to vague generalizations regarding people of their race. If persons onlybargained with individuals of the same race, they would quickly realize how different we all are.Some opponents would behave cooperatively, while others would act in a competitive manner. Somewould be congenial, while other would be less pleasant. Some would exhibit win-lose tendencies,while others would evidence win-win attitudes. Techniques that would be effective against someopponents would be ineffective against others.If, as my data suggest, there is no statistically significant correlation between student race orstudent GPAs and their ability to achieve beneficial results on negotiation exercises, law firms may
16wish to reconsider the degree of reliance they place on student class rank. Although African-American students in my Legal Negotiation class had slightly lower mean GPAs than their Caucasiancounterparts, there was no difference in the average negotiation exercise results achieved by blackand white students. Law firms that place substantial value on class rank cutoffs may thus disqualifyAfrican-American applicants with slightly lower GPAs who would be as likely to perform as wellwith respect to critical lawyering skills as Caucasian applicants with slightly higher GPAs. I believethat performance in skills courses, such as Legal Negotiation, Client Interviewing and Counseling,and Trial Advocacy, is more predictive of the ability of graduating students to execute fundamentallawyering tasks effectively than their grades in traditional examination courses.  My data suggest thatthis is particularly true with respect to African-American students. It would thus behoove law firmsthat wish to treat all applicants fairly to look more closely at the grades achieved by African-American students in skills-oriented courses, even when their overall GPAs are slightly below thoseof Caucasian applicants.Athletes and other performers who have to retain the services of professional negotiatorsshould not underestimate the bargaining abilities of African-American agents. There is no reason tobelieve that black negotiators would be less capable in this regard than white agents. Some African-American athletes and performers may think that black agents could not negotiate as effectively withwhite owners and managers as white agents. Since the African-American students in my LegalNegotiation course achieved results comparable to those attained by Caucasian students in situationsin which they were generally interacting with white students because of the reduced number of blackclassmates, there is no reason to believe that black agents could not deal effectively with whiteowners and managers. This is especially true today, given the increased number of African-American
17general managers and coaches who not only conduct many of the salary negotiations with sportsagents, but also have to interact regularly with their white team owners.
VI.  CONCLUSIONThe nine years of Legal Negotiation course data evaluated by me indicate the absence of anystatistically significant correlation between either student race or student GPAs and the results theyachieve on negotiation exercises. These findings would suggest that whatever cultural and behavioraldifferences  may exist between African-American and Caucasian students has no impact on theirability to achieve beneficial negotiation exercise results. Since my data also indicate that the meanGPAs of black students in my course were slightly below the mean GPAs of white students, lawfirms considering African-American students may wish to look more closely at the performance ofthose students in skills courses than in conventional law school courses. Individuals, such as athletes,retaining agents to negotiate for them should not discriminate unfairly against African-Americanattorneys because of unfounded stereotypical fears that they will not be as capable as Caucasianagents.
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